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The “Is – Ought” distinction in Philosophy explicitly draws its roots from Hume and has since found fluidity among many thinkers. Hume is vehement that no “Ought” can be derived from the “Is”. This paper argues critically with Jonas that the “Ought” can effectively be derived from the “Is”. The “Is” refers to metaphysics while the “Ought” refers to ethics. It is thus understandable why Hume, who launched a book-burning campaign against metaphysics, would deny that ethical values can be derived from metaphysics. Thus, the fundamental problem addressed by Jonas here is that of basing ethical values on metaphysical principles. In a world characterized by the vehement rejection of metaphysics in favour of science, moral values are claimed to be socially constructed rather than having an ontological foundation. This paper, examines Jonas’ solution to the “Is-Ought” problem. It concludes that life is self-affirmative and therefore, must be allowed to be in an authentic fashion.