

Security and forced displacement in central Africa: An analysis of the security implications for Cameroon occasioned by the presence of refugees and for the Central African Republic by the transhumance activity

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Abstract: Forced displacement has become a defining feature of Central Africa. A number of factors have obliged people to flee their homes in search for 'safe heavens' elsewhere, often at the detriment of their own survival and increasingly that of their host. While it is generally accepted that security is amongst the major factors which motivate force displacement, increasingly the security of individual and the territory of the state is also being threatened by force displacement. Using the example of Refugees for Cameroon and transhumance pastoralist for the Central African Republic, this article examines the factors which have transformed force displacement into a security problem for host and transit states. The article then presents the security threats for individuals and the territory of states which emerge from the perverse transformation of force displacement. The paper therefore contends that while forced displacement can incite desired socio-economic ramifications in host and transit states, it remains a serious security problem for these states especially when poorly managed

Keywords: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Africa, Security, Force Displacement, Refugee, transhumance Pastoralist, Threat.

Introduction

Years of chronic instability, repressive governance, internal wars, poverty and deplorable variations in climatic conditions within Africa states have led to protracted displacement of persons in all its forms within the continent (Bayar and Aral, 2019). The number of displaced persons in this region has been on a steady increase. Contrary to popular opinion which considers this displacement as part of a south-north

migration movement (Williams 2019, p. 1), this day's displacement especially forced displacement is more of a south-south issue. At least 1.6million persons have averagely been forcefully displaced in Africa since 2014 (Ibid). Force displacement has become an integral component of the evolution of Africa, especially Central Africa. For decades now people have been obliged to flee their homes in their millions around the continent in order to sort refuge in safer locations. In the course of this journey, many have lost their lives, and property while a cross section continue to succumb to grave hardship. These displaced persons have more often been faced with serious threats to their survival and restrictions on their rights and liberties. For many of them, displacement has proven to be a protracted experience, lasting for years and even decades.

The presence of forcefully displaced persons in host countries significantly impacts on the socio-economic, political and security of this country. For while it has been widely accepted that migrants forcefully leave their homes and countries because they are victims of insecurity, it has also become increasingly evident that the prolonged presence of migrants, couple with inadequate migration management, make them a political, economic, social and security concern for host countries. It is even more evident that forced migration, irrespective of its socio-economic ramifications has become a threat to the security of migrants, transit and destination countries globally.

The security threat posed by forcefully displaced persons to transit and destination countries in the world is acute. No continent, region or sub region is left out. The Central African sub region like other parts of the world is confronted with security issues linked to forced displacement, mostly driven by armed conflicts and by variations in climatic conditions. There is hardly any country in this sub-region which has not been confronted with security problems stemming from the phenomenon of forced displacement during the course of their history. For the purpose of this paper we are going to focus on the security threat for destination countries of forcedly displaced persons in central Africa. The case of refugees for Cameroon and transhumanist for the CAR.

Cameroon has been a privileged migrating destination for forcedly displaced persons, in Central Africa especially for refugees. The fact that Cameroon shares long boundaries with neighbouring countries in turmoil (Chad 1095km, CAR 797km, Nigeria 1690km) and the existence of cross border ethnic groups which share the same cultures, values, speak the same languages has considerably contributed to influence refugee's decision to migrate to Cameroon. The countries conducive environment and its open door policy

vis a vis migrants equally make it an attractive destination for refugees. The state of Cameroon has ratified relevant regional and international legal instruments on refugee protection, notably the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention. Meaning, refugees on Cameroonian soil enjoy many rights and privileges recognised to Cameroonian nationals, notably the right to work, freedom of movement, access to health care and education.

While for the international community refugees pose a humanitarian problem (Stephen 1996, p. 7) for Cameroon and other host countries refugees pose political economic and security problems. Refugee management has most often imposed serious economic burdens on host countries like Cameroon whom are often unprepared or in the incapacity to sustain new economic burdens due to the resource constraints incumbent on them. However, this economic burden is most often quickly mitigated with the arrival of UNHCR and partner agencies, but serious security problems generated by the presence of refugees persist which are a serious challenge to the stability of Cameroon.

Transhumance pastoralism is a centuries-old practice in Africa especially in Central and West African regions (report of group of experts on CAR 2018, p. 27). In central Africa, the practice can be traced as far back as to the 1920s, where a seasonal migration of cattle was regularly witnessed between the months of October to April yearly. During this period, transhumance pastoralist parade pre-established traditional transhumanist corridors in search of pasture for their thousands of cattle (IOM 2014, P.17). The major characteristic of this practice is the seasonal transboundary movement of herders and livestock in search of seasonal availability of pasture and water (Luizza 2017, P. 1). For a long time the practice has been dominated and continues to be dominated by the Muslim peulhs herders, a transnational ethnic group composed of the Mbororo and the Foulbé, which can be found in Cameroon, Chad, CAR and Sudan and South Sudan (Ibid). Over the years, owing to the combined effects of climate change, demography, and improved access to vaccines, the activity has gradually grown in intensity and importance.

CAR with around 16 million hectares, about 312,469 square kilometers of largely under-exploited pasture, cultivable land and a dense hydrographic network is the key area for the practice of transhumance pastoralism in Central Africa (UNFAO 2019). In this country, pastoralism has mainly involved transhumance pastoralist from neighbouring countries especially Chad, Cameroon, Sudan and South Sudan and around 250,000 sedentary pastoralists who are based in CAR mainly composed of the Fulani and Mbarara ethnic groups. However, years of prolonged conflict and instability, pressure linked to climate

change, demographic explosion and displacement have transformed a potentially income/revenue generating activity into an actual and potential threat to the security of CAR state in particular and the region in general.

Conceptualising Security and forced displacement.

Defining the phenomenon of forced displacement is not an easy task (Hugo and Bun 1990, p.20). For the concept is surrounded by a number of controversies and sometimes complex's interpretations and meanings (Rwamatwara 2005, p.173). Forced displacement is most often defined in contrast to voluntary displacement. Without entering into the controversy surrounding the definition of the concept of forced displacement, in this paper forced displacement would refer to *"migrations caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, and serious variations in climatic conditions* (Ibid).

Security is essentially a contestable concept (Junaid Jhandad 2016, p.2). There exist a multiplicity of definitions and interpretations of security amongst authors, theorist and practitioners, all of whom approach the concept based on what they perceive as threat, referent objects and security problems (Ibid). According to Hobbes and Co, though a contestable concept, security by far remains the most important and core value of human lives (Preece 2011). It is the major determinant and or objective of states behaviour (Newnham and Grahams 1998, p 39). Security for many especially the realist entails the protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions, and values from external attack. According to Kenneth Waltz, *'in anarchy security is the highest goal* pursued by all states who desire to protect their sovereignty (Glenn 2002, p 152). And so this tradition conceives security in terms of military threats to the state.

With the end of bipolarity, there has been a progressive shift of focus from state-centric (where external military threat is dominant) to a more expansive understanding of the concept of security which integrates all of humanity and lays greater emphasis to other forms of threats other than military threats to the state in particular and humanity at large (Griffiths, O'Callaghan, and Steve 2014, p 320). The rise of none state actors, social movements, the prominence of civil wars, terrorist attacks, and the emergence of new forms of non-military threats such as increase in population, resource scarcity, spread of diseases, environmental degradation and an ever growing number of displaced persons have considerably altered

existing perceptions, thoughts and understandings about the concept of security. Migration and specifically forced migration has emerged as a non-military threat to states security in the world today.

The threat posed by force displacement is not given, but socially constructed by the actions and interactions of actors. *In order words forced displacement as a threat does not arise from the chance occurrences of the natural order, it is a social threat which stems from the purposive behaviour of other actors*, (McSweeney, 2004, p 90). Reason why this paper will seek to determine the factors which occasion the transformation of forced displaced persons into security threats for destination countries? Before identifying what are the security threats which result from this transformations? Making use of an essentially qualitative research method, a combination of field interviews and desk top research will permit the collection of vital data indispensable for the realisation of this paper. Consequently, the paper will contend that a number of factors linked to the forcefully displaced persons and to their host environment can account for the transformation of this migrants into a security threat for host countries. These forcefully displaced persons have posed a threat to the security of individuals and the territory of the state.

Part I: The security threat posed by refugees to Cameroon

A refugee refers to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his/her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his/her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his/her country of origin or nationality (art 1(2) The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, p 2). An inevitable consequence of civil wars in Africa as whole and central Africa in particular is the emergence of numerous numbers of displaced persons who have become internally displaced persons (IDP) in their own country and refugees in neighbouring countries or other nations who accept to receive and host this persons on their territory. Since the end of bipolarity, conflicts in central Africa have made headlines by their severity, violations of human rights, rape, torture, generalised violence and all sorts of abuses which characterise these conflicts. Women and children have particularly suffered from this ills, which eventually obliges people in their masses to flee their homes in search of a more secure habitats within or out of their country.

Cameroon, alongside its neighbours Chad, CAR, are examples of major refugee producing and host countries in Central Africa (Williams 2019, p 2). The crisis in the north and south west regions of Cameroon has resulted in thousands of IDPs and refugees, a vast majority which have sought refuge in Nigeria. However Cameroon due to its strategic position, in the middle of states which have been and continue to experience violent conflicts or terrorist attacks is host to refugees from Nigeria, Chad and CAR. The forced displacement to Cameroon from these three countries has been as a result of the threat caused by recurrent Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria and Chad, and the instability in the CAR underpinned by cycles of military coups and civil wars. Statistics from UNHCR show that by the 30 of September 2019, there were 294803 refugees from CAR, 108335 refugees from Nigeria, and 1599 refugees from Chad present on Cameroonian territory (UNHCR fact sheet Cameroon, 2019, p 1). Refugees are lodged principally in three regions of Cameroon, the far north, the Adamawa, and the east regions.

In Cameroon, without undermining the positive socio-economic ramifications induced by the presence of refugees, notably with the numerous construction of water points, class rooms/schools, health centres in communities hosting refugees (interviews 2019), their presence nevertheless constitutes a threat to security and territorial integrity. According to James Milner, countries hosting refugees in Africa can be confronted with direct and indirect security concerns, *“Direct security concerns address the high-politics concerns of states, and stem from the presence of armed elements within the refugee population, the spill over of violence and the potential regionalization of conflict while, indirect security concerns address the low-politics concerns of states, and arise when the presence of refugees exacerbates previously existing intercommunal tensions in the host state, shifts the balance of power between communities, or causes grievances among local populations (Milner 2009, p 76).*

This distinction will enable us to further understand the disparity which exist in terms of security concerns between states simply hosting refugees (facing in-direct security concerns) and states neighbouring refugees producing states (facing direct security) concerns. States simply hosting refugees refer to those which do not share any form of borderline or boundary with refugee producing state, but which face security concerns due to the presence of this refugees within their territory. This distinction however does not exclude the possibility of states facing at the same time direct and

indirect security concerns, due to the presence of refugees on her territory and the fact this state shares boundaries with refugee producing states. Cameroon falls into this category. The country as earlier mentioned shares boundaries with refugee producing states such as CAR, Chad and Nigeria, which expose her to both direct and indirect security concerns.

Section I: Indirect security concerns faced by Cameroon due to the presence of refugees within the national Triangle.

They are referred to as indirect security concerns because they do not necessarily arise from the presence of refugees, but have been existing prior to the arrival of refugees, though the refugees' arrival has contributed to highlight, exacerbate and aggravate them within host communities. They include the increase in prostitution, spread of diseases, conflicts over limited resources, arm robbery, highway robbery, criminality and insecurity within communities hosting refugee camps and refugees (interview 2019). Some of the concerns are short term, while others are long-term security problems. Others are short term security concerns because local administrative authorities, the Cameroonian government and international partners are able to quickly adopt measures in view of eradicating the threat.

Short term security concerns.

Rural populations inhabiting the border areas of the far north region and those of the Adamawa and east regions of Cameroon in particular have for some years now been succumbing to exponential pressures on their limited local resources, due to the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries in crisis (PRO-ACT, 2019, p 2). The Adamawa and East regions hosting refugees from CAR, the far north hosting refugees from Chad and Nigeria. Refugees upon arriving Cameroon most often remain and occupy ungoverned spaces along the border areas of these three regions, which already have to cope with relative exclusion, marginalisation, limited resources abject poverty and underdevelopment. Generally, local populations are always the first to receive and provide first aid (food, shelter, and clothing) to refugees arriving from conflict areas (interview with UNHCR officials 2019). However this hospitality quickly disappears as the refugee ranks continue to increase, and conflicts begin to emerge over already scarce resources (fire wood, farming and grazing land, water point's, overcrowding in schools and hospitals etc (interview with senior administrative officials 2019) leading

to frustrations, rising tensions and a global degradation of social cohesion within host communities (PRO-ACT 2019, p. 2).

Tensions over limited resources. With the worsening crisis in their home countries, refugees cross the boundary into Cameroon in thousands, most often haven left everything behind. In these conditions refugees urgently need to survive and most often the first aid they receive from local populations and the Cameroonian administration is usually insufficient to take care of their needs. Refugees therefore have to fend for themselves which Leads them into confrontation with local communities. They need firewood to sell and prepare their meals, farm land to plant food for their family and commercialisation, access to water points to get portable drinking water, access to hospitals and schools. As earlier mentioned all these resources badly needed by refugees are very scares within this communities. The few schools and hospitals in the area are ill-equipped both in materials and human resources, the few water points, if there are any can't accommodate the increase in population, and exploitable farming land is limited.

These resources were already scares and limited before the arrival of the refugees. With the arrival of refugees, the few schools and hospitalised are overcrowded, there is a tense competition between local communities and refugees over farm land, water points, fire wood leading to confrontations, and conflicts which exacerbate tensions, while emerging as a threat to the stability and social cohesion of this area and these regions as a whole (Pokam 2018, p. 63, interview with senior administrative and security officials 2019). The timely intervention of local state administrative authorities, international partners under the coordination of the UNHCR, through sensitization campaigns, joint community-refugee projects, construction of schools, health centres, water points and training and equipment of refugees in order to render them self-reliant, would contribute to dissolve this tensions. (Interviews with UNHCR officials 2019, PRO-ACT 2019, p. 2). However the prolong presence of refugees and an apparent donor fatigue which limits the capacity of UNHCR and its partners to take charge of refugees, finance automatization projects for refugees has progressively lead to the resurgence of tensions, even though the tensions are no longer stricto-senso between refugees and local populations but amongst individuals from both camps (interview with local populations and security officials 2019).

Further tensions between refugees and host communities arise with the intervention of the UNHCR and its partner agencies. These agencies had begun taking charge of refugees, providing them with basic necessities such as food, health care, clothing, water points and camps for the refugees. These actions led to large frustrations and anger within host communities who are irritated by their exclusion from the advantages and help provided to refugees whereas they were the ones who first received the refugees and provided them with live saving support before the arrival and intervention of the state and other international agencies (Interviews with senior administrative officials 2019). These frustrations are further heighten by the attempts by refugees to prevent local populations from using some of the services provided to them by UNHCR and its partners. This has led to confrontations between refugees and local populations (interview with local populations and senior administrative officials 2019). This coupled with the attempt by some refugees to impose their way of life and habits on the local population's thus exacerbating tensions and seriously threatening the stability, peace, pacific co-existence, and social cohesion in these areas (Pokam 2018, p. 55, and interview 2019).The arrival of refugees has equally accelerated the destruction of the environment in terms of tree- cutting in search of fire wood, water pollution, deforestation for setting up camps.

Farmer grazer conflicts. Other refugees did crossed the boundary with their cattle notably the Peulh Mbororo and Peulh Foulbe from the CAR (PRO-ACT 2019, p. 2 and interview 2019). According to a UNDP report, intercommunal clashes between pastoralist and farming communities in the west and centre of the CAR have forced some pastoralist to migrate as refugees into neighbouring countries, including Cameroon (UNDP report 2017, p 48). This cattle owners need grazing land to maintain their flocks. According to information gathered from the field and PRO-ACT reports, a number of factors will lead to conflict amongst grazers and to farmer grazier conflicts. This factors include;

In the first place, these refugees' cattle owners arrive in areas where there are equally individuals and families within the local population who own cattle, which facilitates **conflicts over limited grazing land**.

Secondly, refugee's cattle owners most often upon arriving Cameroon are left with just few of their cattle. This few cattle cannot permit them to earn a leaving out of it, and so the owners have to take up other activities such as meat sale, agriculture in order to survive etc. The few remaining

cattle's are handed to children who are relatively inexperienced to graze in limited secured areas close to the village. In other instances big cattle owners resorted to the services of herds men to take care of their cattle. But because these herds men are under paid, not paid and because the responsibility to compensate in case of damages caused by cattle's is incumbent on the cattle owners and not the herds men, the herds men increasingly became less attentive in executing their missions leading to several litigations against cattle owners for destruction of property. Herds men often used the occasion of resolution of litigations to claim their unpaid salaries (PRO-ACT 2019, p.2, and interviews 2019).

Considering the dangerous nature of the migration route to Cameroon which exposes pastoralist and their cattle to frequent attacks, these pastoralist have therefore arm themselves or recruited rebel elements to ensure their safety till they attain their destination. Consequently, some of these pastoralist cross the boundary to seek for refugee status in possession of weapons, which they readily make resort to in case of attack and or confrontation with local communities (interviews with security and administrative officials 2019). All these factors put together, led to the frequent destruction of agricultural products by cattle's and frequent farmer grazer confrontations which threatened the stability, and social cohesion in this areas.

Another major source of tension which threatens the stability and harmony within refugee populated areas was the **increase in cost of leaving**. The massive influx of refugees into this areas which already witness weak basic social services, especially in terms of means of subsistence (house hold subsistence), meant that the cost of leaving witness and exponential increase which was not accompanied by improved revenues and increase in agro-pastoral production (interview with senior administrative officials, UNHCR officials and local populations 2019). Prices of basic food stuff, fire wood and charcoal increased. In order areas, the few income generating opportunities especially the motor bike riders, businesses of all sort, were flooded by refugees to the extent locals felt threatened (Ibid, 2019). The resultant effect was a rise in animosity and hatred within local communities towards refugees which at times materialised in oral and physical confrontations. Fortunately UNHCR quickly adopted measures, providing local farmers and cattle owners with much needed assistance aimed at boosting their production capacity. This greatly contributed to relief existing tensions. (PRO-ACT 2019, p. 4 and interview 2019)

Long term security concerns

A vast majority of citizens, senior administrative and security officials interviewed in the Adamawa and east regions of Cameroon unanimously agreed that the presence of refugees has heightened insecurity in areas where they are settled. These areas have all witnessed an increase in the rate of criminality, spread of diseases, high way banditry, arm robbery, kidnappings, and prostitution (interviews with senior administrative and security officials 2019). These insecurity though cannot be completely imputed to the arrival of refugees on Cameroonian territory. Underdevelopment, poverty and the closeness of the Adamawa, East and Far North regions of Cameroon to conflict prone neighbouring states and the consequences which result have always ensured the prevalence of this ills in these region (Ibid). A few individuals in these regions who have fail to integrate themselves into the national dynamics, resort to prostitution, high way banditry, arm robbery and illicit trade to survive. According to citizens, senior administrative and security officials interviewed in the Adamawa and east regions, a number of factors associated with the arrival of refugees can account for the rise in this ills which are long term security concerns for Cameroon authorities.

Prime amongst these factors is the fact that most refugees upon arrival into Cameroonian territory have left all they had behind, they can barely afford for the basic necessities they need to survive. In the beginning, support from UNHCR and its partners allowed a cross section of refugees to survive, however the prolong stay of these refugees, coupled with the lack of access to basic services and livelihood opportunities resulting from the reduction of aid from UNHCR and its partners, means that many refugees have resorted to negative coping mechanisms notably prostitution, arm banditry, high way robbery and kidnapping for ransom.

Secondly, some refugees easily make resort to armed and high way robbery because many of them are either presumed Boko Haram fighters, ex-Seleka, ex-Anti Balaka and ex-FACA soldiers who have successfully cross the border, infiltrating themselves amongst the refugees population and still in possession of their arms (Pokam 2018 p.55 and interviews with senior security officials 2019). The porous nature of the borders and the fact that these refugees arrive and cross the borders in masses makes it difficult if not impossible for the underequipped and often outnumbered security forces to conduct a much needed search (interviews with frontier security officials 2019).

Thirdly UNHCR delivers identification cards to all refugees. However this identification proved to be a form of immunity for dangerous elements within the refugee community. A number of robbery incidents, kidnappings and other crimes have been committed by refugees who are quick to sort refuge within their camps at times being pursued by forces of law and order. In the beginning UNHCR officials were very reticent to allow security forces to raid the camps, conduct searches and arrest suspects. It is only after negotiations and the timely intervention of the state of Cameroon that UNHCR decided to grant security forces access to refugee camps (Interviews with senior administrative and security officials 2019).

All these factors put together created a favourable environment for dangerous elements within refugee ranks to carry out their activities. The situation was further aggravated by an underequipped and often overstretched security forces who despite all their efforts were unable to put an end to these ills. The consequences for the stability and security of these regions are simply unmeasurable.

The rate of criminality, arm banditry, high way robbery and kidnappings in areas hosting refugee camps and its environs especially in far north, parts of Adamawa and the east regions is amongst the highest in the country. The spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmittable diseases is common in this areas due to a high rate of prostitutions. Concerning kidnappings, foreign nationals, rich Muslims, local business men, local traditional and administrative authorities are the most targeted groups. Theft of cattle and other forms of robbery are common occurrence in areas hosting refugees. According to security sources interviewed, majority of the individuals carrying out this criminal acts were refugees from Nigeria in Far North and CAR in the Adamawa and East regions of Cameroon (Interviews with senior administrative and security officials 2019). In most instances when this criminals were arrested most were found to be in possession of refugee cards. For further proofs and justification, a majority of the detention facilities visited in this areas during our research were flooded by CAR nationals, some with refugee cards. Most were detained and sentenced for crimes ranging from theft, rape and kidnappings. (Interviews with senior security officials 2019).

Refugee's prolonged stay can lay the foundation of future conflicts. Upon arrival on Cameroonian soil many refugees choose to reside within or outside camps with their families.

Considering their numbers which most often compete if not outnumber that of local communities receiving them, their prolonged stay, the continued expansion of their population, and the ease at which some of them obtain the Cameroonian nationality, pose serious long term security concerns for the area and the country as a whole. In the long run this prolonged stay might lead to political and even violent arm confrontation around issues concerning representation, ownership of property, elections and identity. The impact of migrants in modifying the political landscape of host communities, or countries and their potential to incite conflicts, especially in Africa are no ground breaking news. As seen recently in the CAR where Muslims were considered foreigners (IOM 2014 p 5, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2018, P 4) and Ivory Coast with the concept of “ivoirité”, bad governance, the fragility of African institutions coupled with negative instrumentalisation and manipulations from African statesmen and politicians has ensured the prevalence of identity driven conflicts in the continent. Cameroon could be in the near future be trapped in the web of such conflicts if care is not taken to properly manage refugees and possibly guarantee their lawful return to their home countries.

This fears are even more legitimate in some areas hosting refugees than others. A case in point is Garoua Boulai a border town along the Cameroon CAR boundary in the east region, which is hosting approximately more than 50,000 CAR refugees, ignoring those without residence papers and refugee status. Based on discussions with local populations, CAR refugees and senior security and administrative officials, it was observed that some refugees were laying the basis of their permanent stay in the area. From all indications, many of them had no short or long term project to return to their country of origin. Their intention to settle permanently was further visible as some of them had left their camps and established amongst the local population. Others especially the more wealthy ones had acquired land and build houses. A cross section of bike riders and owners of large business in the town were either CAR refugees or nationals, some had already acquired Cameroonian nationality.

Though others wish to return to their home country, they were prevented from doing so by UNHCR on the assumption that the conditions which caused them to flee their countries of origin had not yet been eradicated to an extent which can permit their return (interview with UNHCR Official and refugees 2019). Failing to own the necessary financial means to transport themselves and their families

back, these refugees have to prolong their stay. Many more refugees though do not wish to return again to their countries of origin due to the psychological trauma suffered during conflicts which made them to flee their countries, others due to the fear of leaving behind the quality life and public services (education, health care, security etc) they have been enjoying in the host country. As earlier mentioned without undermining the positive effects of the presence of these refugees especially the socio-economic effect it has on host communities, the long run effects of their prolonged stay and its capacity to incite future identity/representation based conflict which could threaten the stability and social cohesion of these areas is non negligible.

Direct security concerns faced by Cameroon

Direct security concerns here refers to the insecurity concerns Cameroun is exposed to notably due her sharing boundaries with neighbouring countries in crisis. This concerns include the proliferation of small arms traffic and the spill over of conflict, which is facilitated by the presence of refugee on Cameroonian soil, the infiltration of refugee ranks by rebels, ex-soldiers and suspected terrorists.

According to James Milner, the spill over of conflict facilitated by the infiltration of refugee ranks by armed rebels, ex-soldiers, and suspected terrorists is the strongest security threat countries hosting refugees face (Milner 2009, p. 77), *“It is by far the strongest link between refugee movement and insecurity”*. Cameroon is amongst the countries in Africa whose internal and external security are directly challenged by the presence of refugees on its territory. Due to the fact that Cameroon shares long border lines with conflict affected-neighbours, it is exposed to several direct security threats, which are abated by the presence of refugees on its territory. A number of factors can account for this threat.

As earlier mentioned above, refugees from neighbouring countries flow into Cameroon from different angles or using several routes. Due to the porous and vast nature and the relative control of its borders especially with the CAR and Nigeria, Cameroon security forces almost appear powerless faced with the influx of refugees from these countries. Not only these forces are ill equipped, but their numbers vis-a-vis those of refugees is inferior, which does not permit them to do a proper control of refugees as they may deem fit. Most refugees are no longer in possession of their countries

identification papers, most probably due to the intensity of the conflict and the fact they were obliged to flee their homes without preparing, others misplaced their document in the course of the long journey. The vast and most often uncontrolled border lines, facilitate access into the Cameroonian territory through illegal routes for some refugees. This too further complicates the work of the security forces who lack the means to control all the entry points of refugees. The direct security implications for Cameroon of this uncontrolled influx of refugees into her territory are enormous.

Cameroon's sovereignty over its territory is threatened and violated as dangerous elements succeed to go through the security net set up at the boundary, most often in possession of weapons including arms and explosives, hereby violating border controls and check points. According to an international crisis group report, in 2015, some refugees in the Minawao camp were found in possession of explosive weapons (ICGR 2015, p 20). Top administrative and security officials in the Adamawa and East regions also affirmed that members of the Ex-Seleka, Anti-Balaka and Force Armee Centrafricain (FACA) succeeded to cross the boundary into Cameroon with their weapons (interviews 2019). These dangerous elements have not only been associated to rising criminality in areas hosting refugees, but their use of weapons to commit crimes is a serious challenge to the Cameroonian governments legitimate monopoly to use force over its territory.

Extremist and radical individuals amongst refugees have abused Cameroonians and local community's hospitality. They have taken advantage of their refugee status to carry out recruitment for their groups. This was the case in Kolofata far North region of Cameroon where Cameroonian authorities were able to identify refugees who were recruiting for the terrorist sect Boko Haram (Pokam 2018, p 55).

Others have **used refugee camp as sanctuaries** where they planned their attacks/operations. Attacks which usually included targets within and beyond the Cameroonian territory. All security sources interviewed were unanimous on the fact that dangerous elements within camps especially in the Borgop, Maiganga, Djohong Garoua Boulai and Bertoua, left their camps and were involved in all forms of crimes against the local population and often cross the border to commit other crimes in the CAR before returning to their camps. Some FACA combatants enjoying refuge within refugee camps in Cameroon constituted and organise themselves to launch attacks against Seleka rebels in the CAR.

The porosity of Cameroonian borders and the ease at which these elements were able to acquire Cameroonian papers, refugee cards while still in possession of their CAR identification papers are factors which favoured their actions. The absence of representatives of the administration within refugee camps when they were created and the protectionist policies of UNHCR, also contributed to these threats. With the subsequent appointment of administrative representatives within these camps and the authorisation given to security forces to raid the camps and conduct searches, dangerous weapons were seized, and suspects apprehended. (Interviews 2019).

The presence of these dangerous elements within camps on the Cameroonian territory **exposes Cameroon to cross border attacks** from rebels and often unidentified men, which are a threat to the peace and territorial integrity of Cameroon. The proximity of Cameroonian border towns hosting refugees with anarchical/rebel control neighbouring territories, exposes the state of Cameroon and its security forces to cross border attacks by rebels and often un-identified individuals.

Since 2013, Cameroon boundary areas of the Adamawa, East and North regions have been victims of their cultural and geographical proximity with the CAR. A number of deadly incidents have been recorded involving rebels from the CAR. Cameroon's initial decision to welcome CAR ousted president François Bozizé (Tamekamta 2014, p. 5), members of FACA, the presidential guard, and ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka rebels within refugee camps, and the looting/hostage taking ambitions of these rebels are some of the reasons which favoured rebel incursions on Cameroonian soil leading to frequent confrontation with the Cameroonian frontier security forces. These confrontations led to the death of a Cameroonian frontier security officer, chief of the local frontier post Felix Ngando Dalle at Tocktoyo on the 19th of August 2013 (Cameroon info-net report 2015). Also on the 16th of November 2013, at Gbiti rebel attacks led to the death of an officer and several injured within the ranks of the Cameroon defence forces (Government press release 2013). According to a report in a local journal Cameroon info, at least 180 anti-balaka fighters launched an assault in April 2014 on the border village of Ngaoui, coming from Gaigo in Ouham-Pendé, CAR (Cameroon info 2014). The mayor of Lado was kidnapped 12km from Garoua Boulai by suspected rebels and taken to the CAR, where he spent a month (interview 2019). Anti-Balaka rebels frequently attacked Muslims crossing the border

In reaction to these attacks, Cameroonian authorities decided to expel former President Bozizé on the 11 of February 2014, while her security forces made efforts in view of repelling attacks by Seleka forces retreating from CAR. All these actions prevented the territory from becoming or been used by anti-balaka and Seleka forces as a rear base. Still in response to the attacks, local administrative authorities assisted by the forces of law and order in Garoua Boulai proceeded to the destruction of houses along the border area (Cantonnier zone) with CAR, on the 5 October 2014, several security post were created in the town and along the border, the military aided by the Battalion Intervention Rapide (BIR) and the central command of GMI were deployed along the border in order to reinforce patrols and counter this threat (interviews with senior administrative and security officials 2019)

The **Proliferation of small arms traffic** in the regions hosting refugees was another direct security concern for the state of Cameroon. As attested by the high rate of crimes and offences committed with the use of weapons especially guns in parts of the Adamawa, East and Far North regions of Cameroon, there is no doubt about the proliferation of small arms traffic in these areas (Ibid, 2019). Criminal gangs at times infiltrated amongst refugees have taken advantage of porous borders, inexistent or weak state controls and/or complicity of some state official, as well as the existence cross border networks and ethnic groups, to establish their traffic or business with all the security implications for state victim of this traffic like Cameroon. With the CAR already a house hold name in the proliferation and traffic of arms in Central Africa, it was only but normal that there would be a spill over of the trade into neighbouring countries with whom they share long border lines especially those hosting refugees (interviews 2019). It has equally been proven that Boko Haram has been benefiting from arms smuggled from Mali and Libya (UNDP report 2017, p.47). According to international crisis group, before 2011 boko haram was present in Cameroon though they essentially used the far north region as weapons deposit and transit zone. However since 2014 several Boko-Haram Gun deposits were discovered in Fotokol, Kousseri, Goulfey, Makari and Mokolo (ICG 2014, P.8, and ICGR 2016, p 9).

PART II: The security implications for the Central African Republic of transhumance pastoralism.

Historically, since its inception, transhumance pastoralism gave birth to competition over the use of land and water resources between pastoralist and local communities in Africa. Customary conflict resolution mechanisms was the principal mechanism through which such confrontations were being resolved amongst other mechanisms (UNDP 2017, p 48). CAR has not been an exception to the general rule; there have been conflicts or confrontations between transhumance pastoralist from neighbouring countries especially Chad and local communities over land use, water points, and destruction of agricultural products by cattle's (IOM 2014, p 18, interviews 2019). Semi transhumance and sedentary pastoralist have a long history of pacific cohabitating, though not without conflicts. These conflicts have been existing long before the present crisis, though the present conflict has further exacerbated them (Interview 2019). Increasingly, conflicts linked to transhumance pastoralism have been rightfully been associated with propagating the present crisis, insecurity and instability in the CAR. A number factors can be used to explain the worsening situation of Transhumance and the emergence of security concerns.

SECTION I: Factors occasioning the perverse transformations of Transhumance activity in the CAR.

A number of factors can account for the violent transformation of the transhumance activity in CAR, to the extent the activity has become a threat to the territorial integrity and security of the state. These factors include.

The persistence of Attacks against Transhumance pastoralist and the militarisation of the activity. Sporadic and often targeted attacks, kidnappings, killing, and harassment, of transhumance pastoralist have been an integral part of this activity in the CAR. However, the present conflict in CAR, and other neighbouring countries, worsening climatic conditions (which is fanning more migrations especially of Transhumanist pastoralist), coupled with the prevailing anarchy in many parts of the CAR, especially in the north, east and western part of the countries which form part of a long transhumanist corridor, leading to DRC (Luizza 2017, p 2), have created a conditions described by Herbert Butterfield as that of "*Hobbesian fear*" and by John Herz as a "*security dilemma*" (Battistella 2015, p. 496). According to these authors, "*where ever there is anarchy, a security dilemma emerges progressively...in which individual and groups leaving in such a configuration, generally have to be*

conscious of their security, considering that the probability of being attacked, dominated, subjugated, and even extinguished is high” (Ibid). Continuous attacks, kidnappings, killing, and harassment, of transhumance pastoralist and conflicts has created conditions of insecurity around the practise of the transhumance activity, leading to militarisation by both transhumance pastoralist and local communities in the CAR. Road bandits popular known in CAR as “ Zaranguina”, rebels, armed groups, Self-defence committees, former pastoralist, state security agents and officials and members of extremist organisations have one way or the other been implicated in attacks against pastoral transhumanist, their families and their cattle (ICG 2014, p. 11 and interviews 2019). State security agents and officials where there are any have been accused of harassing transhumance pastoralist with numerous check points and exorbitant fees levied, while the Zaranguina or road bandits have been notorious for theft of cattle, kidnaping for ransom especially on women and children (Ibid). Apart from Zaraguinas there is also a generalised feeling of insecurity for transhumance pastoralist passing through the northern regions. Rebel groups have moved quickly to fill the vacuum left by an absent, and failed CAR state.

Rebels groups have equally levied exorbitant fees on transhumance pastoralist in exchange for protection, permission to operate in their zone of influence (Ibid) etc. The transhumance activity has become one of the major sources of income for rebels and armed groups operating along the transhumance corridor (see Report of panel of experts on CAR 2018, p 28). Yearly, at the coming of transhumance season, the number of roadblocks and checkpoints mounted by rebels and armed groups drastically increase (Ibid). These groups have institutionalised illegal taxation systems along the transhumance corridor, control all cattle markets and monopolised the sale of vaccines (Ibid). The fees imposed by these groups are often quite exorbitant and competition amongst rival groups to control, erect check points further corrupts and exacerbates tensions around the practice of the transhumance (Interview with officials of ministry of interior 2019). Rebel groups have equally been associated with theft incidents, kidnappings and racketing. Some herders, most often former pastoralist who have lost all their cattle have resorted to theft and all sorts of crimes to survive. Transhumance pastoralist are their major targets. Their experience in transhumance pastoralism permits them to quickly identify the time, routes, movements and areas in which the pastoral transhumanist would be more vulnerable to

attacks (ICG 2014, p. 13). Government security agents have equally amplified the insecurity faced by the transhumance pastoralist. They too have erected checkpoints which have served to intimidate and demand money from herders (IOM 2014, P.18). During and post the current conflict, the insecurity linked to the transhumance activity have heightened, as both Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements have indulge themselves in kidnappings for ransom, extortion, and theft of cattle.

The security dilemma resulting from the prevailing anarchy in vast areas of CAR, especially around the transhumance corridor has led individuals into a self-help condition wherein they are obliged to ensure their security, which may intern produce the unintended consequence of insecurity (HERZ 1950, p. 1). Transhumance pastoralist, Local farmers, semi transhumance and sedentary pastoralist faced with increasing attacks and with the incapacity of the central government in Bangui and the MINUSCA forces to ensure and protect them, have resorted to arming themselves, creating Self-defence committees, and paying allegiance to rebel and armed groups. Some have simply migrated to other countries like Cameroon (UNDP report 2017, p. 48). The resulting security implications for the CAR are abound.

The violent transformation of pre-existing conflicts between transhumance pastoralist and local communities. As earlier mentioned, conflicts between local farmers and pastoralist are a common and recurrent phenomenon in CAR. Yearly, a number violent confrontations are recorded between armed transhumance pastoralist and local farmers. Wealthy transhumance pastoralist regularly enter into confrontation with poor local farmers when their large herds of cattle destroy farmer's crops or local farmers attack and steal transhumanist herds for local consumption or commercialisation (Guy-Florent et Vircoulon 2018, p. 5). In the beginning, the transhumance pastoralist were unarmed but with the increasing attacks and theft of their cattle, transhumance pastoralist began arming themselves (interview with diplomats and officials of ministry of interior 2019). In the past, conflicts between Transhumance pastoralist and farmers were quickly resolved through traditional/customary conflict resolution mechanisms, including amicable settlement, negotiations and or through the direct intervention of state officials (ibid). However, due to the fact that some pastoral Transhumanist became increasingly arrogant and unwilling to compensate farmers for destruction of their agricultural products, combined with the persistent attacks and hostility of some

local farmers and other criminal groups towards transhumanist, and the frequent interference, most at times in favour of pastoral transhumanist by the Chadian army, relations between transhumanist and local communities continued to deteriorate (interviews 2019). The persistent instability and the generalised anarchy which prevailed following the overthrow of former CAR president Bozize further aggravated the situation as the local customary dispute resolution mechanisms completely disappeared (IOM 2014).

The militarisation of the transhumance activity and the collapse of the customary conflict resolution mechanisms coincided with **the emergence of neo pastoralist**” who own large herds and benefited from the protection and escort by professional armed men, most often belonging to the Chadian army (ICG 2014, pp. 14-15 and interviews 2019). Not only has the increase in number of cattle exacerbated existing tensions, herds drovers working for “neo pastoralist” (mainly from the political and military class in Chad, CAR, Soudan, with no mastery of pastoralist culture), have exceeded in violating established pastoralist codes (ibid). This drovers boosted by the political and military backup/protection have not only become arrogant and aggressive (interview with officials of ministry of interior 2019), they have been violating multiple arrangement between transhumance pastoralists and farmers, intimidating and forcefully using lands and water points belonging to local communities along their path. The ever increasing numbers of transhumance pastoralist /cattle has also led to an increase competition over the resources linked to transhumance pastoralism notably land and water points. Transhumance pastoralist have therefore been increasingly abandoning recognised transhumance corridors in favour of territory reserved for agriculture, leading to confrontation (Guy-Florent et Vircoulon 2018, p.6). The security implications for the CAR of the negative transformation of the transhumance activity cannot thus be overlooked.

The absence of an orderly and organised transhumance corridor, with security brigades, vaccination points has also contributed to the violent transformation of the conflict (Interview with ECCAS official, 2019). In neighbouring Chad where millions of herds cross the boundary into CAR yearly, the Chadian government has made provision for a special brigade of 2000 to 3000 troops to escort herders through established transhumanist corridors to the boarder (Interviews with Chadian official member of diplomatic corps 2019). These brigades do not only ensure the security of the transhumanist but also ensure users respect transhumanist corridors. Anarchy has prevailed yearly in

prone transhumance areas in the CAR, due to the absence of the state. Initially orderly transhumance corridors void of any agricultural activities existed in the CAR. However due to the absence of the state, coupled with frequent violations of these pre-established corridors by transhumanist, local populations will in retaliation start cultivating along established transhumance corridors, thereby violating them and paving the way for eventual confrontation with transhumance pastoralist. Such violations and the precarious situation in the country contributed to the disappearance of this corridors. The absence of orderly transhumance corridors or their non-respect have contributed to the emergence of conflict and the militarisation of the activity.

SECTION II: The security concerns resulting from the perverse transformations witnessed by the transhumanist activity.

According senior security officials, senior diplomats of foreign countries, and of international and regional organisations, civil society/human rights organisations, association of victims and interviewed local populations the practice of the transhumance pastoralism in the CAR is amongst the major sources of insecurity in CAR. They advance a number of security concerns for the CAR, which have emerged and persisted due the violent transformation of this activity. This security concerns include;

The increasing threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the CAR. Historically, the invasion/intrusion of foreign armed groups including armed individuals/bandits, gangs, rebels, neighbouring country's military and terrorist organisations has been a factual reality independent of the transhumance activity in CAR (Interviews with officials of minister of interior 2019). However, over the years, this activity has increasingly become a major facilitating mechanism or motivating factor for the territorial invasion of CAR (Ibid). The lucrative nature of the transhumance pastoralist activity, the location of pastoral areas and routes in "ungoverned spaces" within the CAR, has attracted/facilitated the invasion and unauthorised occupation of the CAR territory by foreign armies, rebel groups, bandits/ gangs and terrorist groups (ICG 2014, p.12 and interviews 2019). Before the overthrow of the government in 2013, road bandits/blockers were mostly composed of former combatants, bandits and former pastoralist, from Chad and Sudan and rebel groups like the Popular Front for Recovery (FPR) of Chadian rebel lord Baba Lade. These rebels and bandits have invaded,

occupied and are controlling territories in the CAR (ICG 2014, p/13). Pastoral Transhumanist from Chad and Sudan have crossed and settled in many regions of the CAR, without any governmental authorisation (Guy-Florent et Vircoulon 2018, p 7). Following the dissolution of the Seleka rebel group, there has been a proliferation of armed groups, including the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC), the 3R or Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation. These groups alongside others which have been existing in the CAR, have been accused of major human rights crimes and other ills (Luizza 2017, p.4). The Chadian army has regularly been accused of crossing the border into the CAR, either escorting large herds or intervening in transhumance pastoralist and farmer conflicts (ICG 2014, p.14, and interview 2019). This persistent violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the CAR, have not only challenged the latter's authority over its borders, but has heightened its incapacity to enforce its legitimate monopoly to use force across its territory. Simply put these invasions have been a serious catalyst of destabilisation of the CAR.

Transhumance pastoralism is contributing to propagate conflict in the CAR. Following the rebel take over in 2013 and the generalised anarchy which reigned in the CAR, there was an upsurge in inter-community violence between Seleka rebels (mainly composed of Muslims) and the Anti Balaka (a majority Christian militia). This violence quickly spread all over the country aggravating pre-existing conflicts. Conflicts linked to transhumance pastoralism haven't been exempted by this contagion. As earlier mentioned, transhumance pastoralism has been dominated by the Mbororos and Peulh who have been widely considered to be foreigners and Muslims by many central Africans due to their practise of Islam, their nomadic tendencies and their mastery and use of the Arabic language. Existing tensions between pastoralist and farmers have been aggravated by a presumed link of transhumanist with the Seleka rebels (AIDSPC report 2015, p.33). Apart from the fact that the rebels speak Arabic and are mostly Muslims by faith like the transhumanist, the preferential treatment this transhumanist and their cattle received from the Seleka rebels further confirmed this suspicion.

This climate of suspicion only contributed to heighten pre-existing tensions and a generalised sense of distrust amongst transhumanist and local communities, often leading to violent arm confrontation or intercommunal violence. During the peak of the crisis pastoral Transhumanist, semi-

transhumanist, and sedentary pastoralist were the main targets of Anti-Balaka attacks which led to deaths, extortions, kidnaping for ransom, theft or seizure of cattle, looting of property and forced displacement u,(AIDSPC report 2015, p.33). A number of villages have also been completely wiped off. Violent confrontations have equally been recorded between rebel groups especially in the North West of the CAR, over the control of check points, seasonal migration routes, territories, theft of cattle, and taxes linked to the transhumance activity (CES-MOS 2019, p. 4). A variety of taxes linked to the transhumance activity are a major source of income for rebel groups. Competition over who perceives taxes paid by transhumance pastoralists in order to secure access to pasture for their cattle and as transit fees have led to violent confrontations, violating the political accord for peace and reconciliation in the CAR (Ibid).

Transhumance pastoralism has become one of the main drivers of **illicit trade and proliferation of arms traffic in the CAR**. Recurrent conflicts, tensions, and regional instability, have led to the widespread possession, circulation, and trafficking of arms in the CAR. (CAR-NRPP2017-2021, p. 1). According to senior security officials interviewed, the arms proliferation in the CAR has increasingly been linked to the transhumance pastoralism. In effect, it has been discovered that lorry's transporting cattle from Chad and Sudan passing through northern CAR, most often on their way to DRC have been illegally transporting arms most at time in their fuel tanks or beneath the pasture meant for cattle consumption during the journey. (Interview with official of ministry of interior 2019). The ease at which youths acquire guns in the CAR, is amongst the principal sources of instability and the prevailing armed criminality in the country. It is this facility to access arms that has equally rendered impossible successive attempts by the CAR authorities to enforce their legitimate monopoly of use of force over her territory (Ibid).

The activity could become a catalyst for the upsurge of violent Extremism in the CAR. It is no ground breaking news that there exist a number of factors which may lead to the emergence of violent extremism in the CAR. High levels of illiteracy amongst youths, and their apparent exclusion in the management of the affairs of the country, coupled with the manipulated transformation of the conflict into a religious/confessional confrontation between Muslim and Christian, marked by the continuous persecution of Muslims could be an important catalyst for the emergence of violent

extremism in the CAR (Knoop and Buchanan-Clarke, p. 17). The existence of multiple safe havens for all forms of illicit and criminal activity within the territory of the CAR, is equally a factors which can ease the spread of violent extremism in the CAR. The incapacity of weak national institutions, to achieve, maintain social and national cohesion, coupled with the absence of prosecution for human rights violations, has crowned, “victors’ justice” to become the norm in the CAR, creating an environment of widespread impunity (CAR-NRPP2017-2021, p. x) which could potentially lead to the spread of violent extremism in the country. The militarisation of the transhumance activity, the increasing radicalisation of local communities especially amongst youths (both Muslims and non-Muslims) who are increasingly joining armed groups, and the recurrent stigmatization of transhumance pastoralist on the bases of their religion could possibly transform the transhumance activity into a catalyst for violent Extremism in the CAR. The fact that the CAR is situated in the hearth of Africa surrounded by countries already victim of violent conflict further raises concern about the potential danger of the negative transformation of the transhumance pastoralism in the CAR.

The perverse transformation of the transhumance activity further amplifies food security crisis in the CAR. Food insecurity remains one of the most pressing challenges international actors are facing in the CAR (Relief web, 2019). According to the Global Hunger Index 2019, the Central African Republic has the worst hunger index in the world. A number of factors can be mobilised to explain Food insecurity in the CAR. Consecutive years of reduced harvests, sharp decrease in the level of production, crop disease, heavy rain but most especially conflict has significantly exacerbated food insecurity in the CAR.

The major consequences has been the increase in prices of staple foods including rice, sorghum, maize, cassava, beans and cow meat (See UNFAO-CAR 2020, p.1, and interviews 2019). Concerning the increase in meat prices, resource persons interviewed in Bangui, confirmed that meat prices have tripled since the beginning of crisis in 2012. According to them persistent attacks and excessive illegal taxation of transhumanist and herders by rebel groups justify the price increase (Interviews 2019). The insecurity surrounding the practice of transhumance and pastoralism in the CAR, has led to a significant drop in number of cattle present within the territory of the CAR (Tidjani, 2018, p. 15). According to Tidjani, the number of cattle per head drop from 5.2million to 4million in

2014, and has continued to drop with the continuation of the crisis marked by the war of positioning amongst competing rebel groups over the control of resources linked to transhumance and cattle markets. Consequently, many herders have moved their cattle to more secured areas in neighbouring countries.

Insecurity and the absence of the state along most transhumance corridors and cattle rearing areas in the CAR, has led to the almost total absence of local animal health services (Relief web CAR 2017). The absence of this indispensable animal health services means that cattle's are not vaccinated and are exposed to all forms of diseases. Rebels groups have exploited this vacuum and are providing vaccines at exorbitant rates to cattle owners (see report of panel of experts on CAR, 2018, 28). This situation has equally contributed to the increase in cattle prices and evasion of cattle to other countries.

Conclusion.

Security and forced displacement have increasingly become interdependent concept in the 21st century. It has been demonstrated that both concepts have the capacity to trigger one another. Security is one of the main triggers of forced displacement in the contemporary world as people flee their habitats due to threats and in search of security. At the same time forced displacement too has triggered security concerns for transit and destination countries. While it is certain that humanity is set to continue witnessing forced migration movements, transit and destination have to adopt immigration policies that will permit them to mitigate the perverse effects instigated by this phenomena.

In Central Africa, forced displacement invariably is one of the main geopolitical issues perturbing the stability of this conflict prone region primarily due to its implications for the national security, economy and social order of states in this region. This can be seen in the security implication of the presence of refugees in Cameroon and the threat pursued by the transhumance activity to the security of the CAR. The intricacies, stakes and complexity of this threat most often impose a transnational than national solution.

In Cameroon, the state has been confronted with direct and indirect threats to her security emanating from the presence on her territory of refugees from neighbouring states. The state with the support of international partners was able to adopt policies to contain the threat. However, organized

crime linked to the presence refugee persist. Mindful of the fact that organized crime pursues a non-military, it is necessary for the state reinforce its intelligence arsenal in order to be able to counter this threat.

In the CAR, as outline in article 14 and 15(Bangui accord 2019, p 34) of the political accords for peace and reconciliation in the CAR, the transhumance activity is essential for the harmonious economic development of herders and farmers in the country. It is more than ever before evident that the search for peace and sustainable development in the CAR, must imperatively integrate and take into account the transhumance sector, which has long been neglected. For this activity has the capacity to significantly transform/boost economic performance and food security in the CAR. Consequently, any hopes of achieving sustainable development and prosperity must pass by securisation and pacification of the transhumance activity which is key to the stabilisation of the country. The rehabilitation of the authority of the CAR state is indispensable in achieving this goal. So too is a regional approach in tackling the problem of transhumance which is significantly a transnational problem.

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Interviews.

1. Interviews in the East region were carried out principally in Garoua Boualai, with senior administrative (D.O) and security official (Gendarmerie, public security and frontier police, and military officers)

traders, refugees from the CAR, commercial motor bike riders, Transporters and local populations. Interviews were conducted on 9th, 11th, 12th, and 13th September 2019.

2. In the Adamawa region interviews were conducted principally in Meiganga with senior administrative officials (SDO), and officials of the UNHCR on the 10th of September 2019.
3. In the CAR, interviews were carried out in Bouar, Yaloke, and Bangui, civilians, internally displaced persons, Teachers and students of higher learning institutions, FACA officers, Drivers, civil society organisations, human rights activist and members of the inter religious platform for peace and reconciliation in the CAR.
4. Senior Diplomats from several states (Chad, DRC, Cameroon, and Gabon) and organisations (ECCAS, AU) were equally interviewed.
5. Senior Administrative officials (ministry of interior and mines) were equally interviewed.

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