


Foreign Policy and Climate Diplomacy: Addressing Challenges and Regulating Key Actors in Global Climate Governance

Doa'a Lutfi Mahmud Hassnin Al Derabani

Researcher, Faculty of School of Graduate Studies, Department: Faculty Prince Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II School of Political Science and International Studies - Department of International Relations and Diplomatic and Regional Studies

Abstract: The inadequacy of commitment towards real actions of reducing the emissions has been an old profile of global climate governance mainly because of inequity arguments, disjointed enforcement, and the national interest profile. In this paper, the author explains the influence of foreign policy on climate diplomacy and governance amongst major state and non-state actors, using the example of the region of Jordan. The study is informed by interpretivism and is based on qualitative analysis of documents and comparative analysis of international treaties (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement), policy reports and sources related to Jordan, the Fourth National Communication (2023), Second Biennial Update Report (2022), and Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2023). The results show that the energy industry has been the major source of greenhouse gas emissions, with an approximate figure of 79% of the cumulative emissions. The current target of Jordan is to reduce emissions by 31% by 2030 (5% unconditional and 26 percent conditional), an important step up in ambition. The study recommends a stronger regional cooperation in MENA, a solar climate financing and technology transfer framework, legal framework harmonization, transparent frameworks of monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), and stronger involvement of non-state actors. The results are consistent with the National Climate Change Policy 20202050 and National Adaptation Plan (2023) of Jordan, as it is suggested that mutually reinforcing relations between foreign policy and climate governance can lead to an increase in credibility, compliance, and equity in the delivery of sustainable climate results. The analysis also highlights the significance of non-state and community-level involvement in strengthening national strategies. In this regard, the Al-Munther Al-Monakhi Initiative, which is the effort of the author to translate the global agreements into local, inclusive, and culturally related action, which was also voluntary, can be used as an applied concept of how climate diplomacy can be society-centric.

Keywords: Foreign policy; climate diplomacy; global climate governance; Jordan; polycentric regulation.



1. Introduction

Climate change has emerged as one of the challenges of the twenty-first century, which not only changes the nature of the ecosystem and economies but also transforms the nature of global politics. It knows no boundaries, so no country can afford to act alone. The increase in sea levels, the changes in weather conditions, and the aggravation of natural disasters have forced governments to admit that climate change is not only an environmental problem but a burning question of international relations. In that regard, foreign policy and climate diplomacy are becoming more and more closely linked as the foundation of global warming reduction efforts, resource control, and the creation of a sustainable future.

Although the Paris Agreement of 2015 was welcomed as a breakthrough in global collaboration, there is a question as to whether the promised cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can prevent catastrophic warming (Neufeld, 2019). In fact, the emissions have been on the increase globally, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2021-2023) is alarmed that the planet has under ten years to curtail the growth of warming to 1.5 °C above the pre-industrial temperatures. The impossibility of closing the gap between the promises and the practice underlines the difficulties in implementing the international climate agreements within the disintegrated world order.

The key flaw in climate diplomacy is the gap between the Global North and the Global South. Developed nations are historically the largest contributors to emissions since the Industrial Revolution, and it increasingly created pressure on them to contribute more. Emerging and developing economies, however, feel that they have to stick to economic development and the alleviation of poverty as their priority. This tension could be found in the concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" embedded in the UNFCCC, which offers exemptions and lenient commitments to the less industrialized countries (Delgado, 2019). One of the main weaknesses of climate diplomacy is the gap between the Global North and the Global South. Developed nations are historically the largest contributors to the emissions since the Industrial Revolution, and it increasingly created pressure on them to contribute more. Emerging and developing economies, however, feel that they have to stick to economic development and alleviation of poverty as their priority. This tension is embodied in the idea of common but not equally shared responsibilities that are entrenched in the UNFCCC, which allows less industrialized countries to be exempted and make their commitments flexible (Delgado, 2019).

Climate diplomacy has also included financial and technological transfers that are aimed at compensating developing countries because of historical injustices and to enable them to take low-carbon development paths. The concept of ecological debt epitomizes the moral and political case that the industrialized countries are indebted to the developing world because of centuries of taking resources and damaging the environment (Sengupta and Friedman, 2019). The Green Climate Fund and other mechanisms were established to finance adaptation and mitigation initiatives in the vulnerable countries. However, the payments have, in many cases, not been made in accordance with the commitments, and the controversy over the funding is a constant element of disagreement in climate negotiations (UNDP, 2019). The outcome is a lack of trust, which destroys the credibility of the international climate regime.

The other dimension is the presence or hindrance of climate diplomacy by foreign policy. The decision-making process is usually dominated by the priorities of the national interests, with the climate issues being second to energy security, economic competitiveness, or geopolitical rivalries. As an example, the fact that the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement in 2017, only to reverse the withdrawal, shows how a home politics may sidetrack multilateral gains

(Harvey, 2019). Likewise, Russia and some of the Gulf countries have opposed strict commitments on the basis of their reliance on fossil fuel revenues (Kuwonu, 2020). Meanwhile, other states, including small island developing states (SIDS), have emerged as noisy leaders in climate diplomacy and have been articulating climate change as an existential security challenge that requires urgent global response. These contrasting foreign policy strategies demonstrate the construction of climate diplomacy on the basis of power asymmetry, calculating interests, and domestic politics.

The Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2023) perceives Jordan as aiming to minimize its GHG emissions by 31% by 2030 -5% of this goal is domestic and 26% of this goal is conditional on the international assistance (Updated NDC, 2023). The Jordan environmental diplomacy focuses on waste management, the adoption of renewable energy, as well as involvement in regional and international forums. Jordan's climate diplomacy now aligns closely with the National Climate Change Policy 2020–2050 and the Economic Modernization Vision (2022–2033), both of which integrate environmental sustainability into national development and foreign policy agendas. Nevertheless, there are still threats such as a lack of resources, finances and the geopolitical implications of receiving a high number of refugees. The study of climate diplomacy in Jordan can offer some insight into how countries of the middle-income group balance the advantages of development, security, and environmental management.

In addition to the state actors, there are the non-state actors, such as cities, corporations, and civil society organizations, who have become major players in climate governance. Cities, including but not limited to C40 Cities, are leading in new climate policies, usually bypassing national governments to create transnational connections (van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007). Corporations themselves are beginning to be held responsible with regard to their carbon footprint, and the non-governmental bodies are lobbying towards more transparency and ambition in the climate policy. The control of these various actors, however, is still disjointed and unbalanced, with the issue of accountability and enforcement raising some concerns (Addaney, 2019). It is therefore important to enhance governance structures that bring together the state and non-state actors to enhance coherent and effective climate diplomacy.

The current study aims to address these gaps by discussing how foreign policy and climate diplomacy interact with each other, especially the issue of governing key participants in global climate regulation. Although the literature on environmental diplomacy has extensively discussed the field in general (Robertua, 2016; Johnson et al., 2015), the potential of the foreign policy framework to explicitly influence climate negotiations, enforcement, and equity contention is not adequately analyzed. In addition, the role of the non-state actors in outcomes has not been given enough attention, but this is increasing in terms of control. Through examining global trends and the particular situation in Jordan, the research would help in bridging such gaps.

The research seeks to answer two key questions:

- 1) How does foreign policy shape and influence climate diplomacy in addressing global challenges such as transboundary emissions, equity disputes, and enforcement of international agreements?
- 2) What mechanisms of regulation and governance can effectively manage the roles of key state and non-state actors to enhance cooperation, accountability, and compliance?

By doing this, the study offers both theoretical and policy relevant provisions and gives recommendations on how to improve the architecture of global climate governance as well as placing the diplomacy of Jordan in this context.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Climate change has become one of the major challenges of international politics, putting an unprecedented strain on the cooperation of states, but at the same time, further dividing the Global North and South. Even with such international agreements as the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the question of whether these commitments are reflected in tangible greenhouse gas reduction and the reduction process itself has a significant gap, explaining the existence of conflicting national interests, equity issues, and weak enforcement (Neufeld, 2019; Harvey, 2019). Foreign policy is a central factor that determines such dynamics because the priorities of domestic politics, security issues, and economic needs frequently determine the size of climate diplomacy (Kuwonu, 2020). However, this disunity of reactions among the states and the lack of fairness in the embracement of non-state actors destroy the efficiency of world governance.

Current literature in the field of environmental diplomacy has covered the connection between climate governance and international relations on a large scale, and the role of foreign policy in the explicit governance of climate diplomacy and the regulation of state and non-state actors in this regime has been underrepresented (Robertua, 2016; Johnson et al., 2015). This leaves a loophole in the conceptualization of the mechanisms capable of improving cooperation, accountability, and compliance of different actors.

This study addresses the gap by examining the process of foreign policy as a determinant of climate diplomacy in international governance, and suggests regulatory instruments which enhance international collaboration, using climate diplomacy in Jordan as a case study on a regional scale.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Foreign Policy and Climate Diplomacy—Regulating Key Actors in Global Climate Governance

Foreign policy has emerged as the primary venue of responding to the planetary dangers of climate change in terms of converting domestic priorities and geopolitical interests into policy directions that influence multilateral bargaining, norm diffusion and compliance regimes. At the border between international relations theory and environmental governance, in which problems are transboundary, causality diffuse, and equity claims make rule-making more complex, climate diplomacy, as the practice of negotiating, implementing, and socializing climate commitments, sits (Pillay and Fitchett, 2019; Kamali and Jönsson, 2019). Since the initiatives regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emission, as well as climate effects, transcend borders and jurisdictions, the customary state-centric framework is not sufficient on its own but needs to be coordinated by foreign policy to create a heterogeneous space of state and non-state actors, including multilateral secretariats and clubs, business, city, and civil society, with different capacities and gaps in accountability (Coffel & Radley, 2017; Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

The post-Paris approach to climate diplomacy by the European Union demonstrates how the tools of foreign policy can be mobilized to keep ambition cycles going, make climate diplomacy mainstream and align mitigation and adaptation with stability, migration and prosperity issues (Climate Diplomacy, 2020). Paris itself is widely read as a foreign-policy success because it replaced top-down burden sharing with nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and iterative “ratchet” mechanisms that states can champion abroad and institutionalize at home (Oberthür and Groen, 2017). Yet ambition on paper collides with implementation deficits rooted in uneven capacities, competing development imperatives, and distributive conflict—especially across the North–South divide, where historical responsibility, the “right to development,” and loss-and-damage finance animate negotiation fault lines (Council of the EU, 2020; Woodroffe & Guy, 2020).

In order to comprehend this complicated network of relationships, researchers emphasize the significance of knowledge platforms, connecting climate science to the diplomatic practice. These platforms combine risk assessment, foreign policy tools, and results of the negotiation as in Figure (1) below:




Figure 1: Knowledge platform

Source: (Detges, 2017)

Figure (1) above shows the process of translating climate knowledge into foreign-policy processes, emphasizing the direction through which scientific indicators lead to negotiation processes and diplomatic results.

One of the main threads in the literature underlays the plurality of climate diplomacy as a field that draws intellectual traditions of realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism, and critical thinking (Hirst, 2015; Zaree et al., 2016). The possible gap in resources, strategic competition, and the possibility of environmental destruction are analyzed as a catalyst to conflict through the prism of realist influence, and the risks of climate change can be viewed as the threat multipliers that have to be considered and addressed by the foreign policy (Westing, 2013; Werrell & Femia, 2019). The liberal and institutionalist approaches emphasize complexes of regimes, compliance management, and the ability to coordinate the proliferating agreements and organizations to limit leakage, address measurement issues, and strengthen the norms (Ghumman & Horney, 2016; Parrock & Lory, 2020). Constructivist and critical work interrogate the meanings attached to “nature,” the social production of vulnerability, and North–South inequities that are replicated in governance designs and finance rules (Zaree et al., 2016).

The empirical record since Rio 1992 shows that climate diplomacy proceeds in cycles of agenda-setting, agreement, operationalization, and recalibration in response to scientific updates and geopolitical shocks (Bloomberg, 2020). On the one hand, iterative updates to indicators—global mean temperature, atmospheric GHG concentrations, ocean heat content, and carbon budget balances—provide the scientific backbone that foreign ministries, finance officials, and security

communities increasingly reference in strategic planning (Met Office, 2019; World Glacier Monitoring Service, 2019; Friedlingstein et al., 2019) as illustrated in Figure (2) below:




Figure 2: The cascading benefits of climate action

Source: (Detges, 2017)

Figure (2) shows how anthropogenic emissions are redistributed across atmosphere, land, and ocean sinks, providing the measurement foundation for accountability and governance in international negotiations.

On the other hand, governance fragmentation and mandate overlaps complicate coordination: UNEP’s limited authority, the multiplication of secretariats, and competing organizational logics within international economic institutions often lead to over-treatment of some issues and neglect of others (Bulkeley, 2015). In this context, foreign policy can help align arenas—trade, finance, development, security—by mainstreaming climate criteria into export credit, debt, and investment screens, and by brokering interoperability among standards and disclosure regimes (The Federal Foreign Office, 2020).

The most intractable diplomatic issue is equity disputes. Sharing of the work is conditioned by disputed accounts of past emissions, capacity, and developmental directions, which result in repetitive deadlocks between the developed, emerging, and least-developed country formations (Federal Foreign Office of Germany, 2018; United Nations, 2018). The paradox of the South is sharp: development has to be fast in order to help people get out of poverty, and at the same time, carbon-intensive paths are going to make it impossible to avoid becoming victims of climate-harmful outcomes (Cladi & Locatelli, 2016). Foreign-policy decisions of Brazil, China, and India are discussed in a case study focusing on the impact of domestic political economies on shaping foreign-policy preferences (e.g. the emphasis on growth and energy security) and slowly incorporating low-carbon technologies and mechanisms, including the Clean Development Mechanism or national carbon markets (Krampe et al., 2018; Moran et al., 2019).

Simultaneously, the literature mentions that proactive foreign-policy involvement in climate action creates ripple effects outside of the emission reductions, including stability, prosperity, and resilience, as discussed in Figure (3) below:




Figure 3: Global annual mean temperature difference from pre- industrial conditions (1850–1900). The two reanalyses (ERA5 and JRA-55) are aligned with the in-situ datasets (Had CRUT, NOAA Global Temp and GISTEMP) over the period 1981–2010.

Source: (Met Office, 2019)

Figure (3) above presents the overlapping benefits of foreign policy and climate action, which include better security and sustainable development, better governance and cooperation mechanisms.

Security framings have elevated the expenditures of climate threats by foreign and defense ministries; however, they have trade-offs. Identifying climate change as a security issue has the potential of marshalling resources and focus, but has the danger of militarizing policy responses, displacing social policy, or justifying forceful management of resources (Kheyrian, 2019). The research on environmental conflict warns against the deterministic assertions of the practice of resource wars and that water and other common resources are equally likely to promote cooperation and institution-building (Gleick, 2018; Krampe et al., 2018).

There are three parallel ways through which regulatory mechanisms to control major actors are changing. To begin with, measurement and transparency systems, such as national inventories, corporate disclosure, and product-level standards, decrease the level of uncertainty, facilitate comparability, and provide the information foundation of accountability. Second, compliance and implementation support, including capacity building, transfer of technology, and funds, changes the nature of diplomacy from focusing on bargaining targets to creating the means to reach them. Third, non-state actors, such as subnational governments, firms, and NGOs, are involved in polycentric regulation on a voluntary basis and through transnational networks, which can supplement the operations of treaties (Bulkeley, 2015).

Despite these advances, systemic obstacles persist: ambition gaps, enforcement asymmetries, and the risk that governance complexity dilutes responsibility. To address them, the literature points to several foreign-policy levers, such as climate-finance compacts, just-transition mechanisms, and unilateral coalitions. When these factors align, the titular gains of climate action support the

ambition of diplomacy; when they fail to, fragmentation, equity conflicts, and poor enforcement obstruct change (Climate Home News, 2020; Council of the EU, 2020).

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study adopts a qualitative research design that combines document analysis and comparative case study approaches. Such a design is appropriate because the research questions focus on how foreign policy shapes climate diplomacy and how governance mechanisms regulate the roles of state and non-state actors in international climate negotiations. The comparative aspect is particularly effective in rating both global frameworks like UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol as well as regional case studies, especially the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which is always prepared to be described as a climate-vulnerable region (Douglas and Graeme, 2010). The research will utilize the Fourth National Communication (2023) and Second Biennial Update Report (2022) prepared by Jordan to get the latest data on emissions and adaptation steps. The MENA region has a geographical boundary, as illustrated in figure (4) below, and this is important in global climate governance.



Figure 4: Map of the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region

Source: (Manfred, 2019)

3.2 Research Philosophy

The philosophical perspective of this study would be interpretivism. This paradigm focuses on the meaning and context, especially the manner in which players in the international arena construct their duties, deliberate on their duties and create discourses in climate diplomacy (Ed & Gustavo, 2016). In contrast to positivist traditions that focus on the existence of universal causal laws, interpretivism permits a fine-tuning understanding of equity conflicts, competing national interests, and the disputed responsibilities between developed and developing countries (King, 2015).

3.3 Sample of the Study

The sample of the study consists of purposively selected documents and literature. These include international treaties such as the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement; official policy frameworks; reports from international organizations such as the World Bank and IPCC; and

scholarly studies on climate governance. The MENA region is used as a focal case study as it is highly vulnerable to extreme heat, drought, and water insecurity (Pathak & Mandalia, 2016).

3.4 Instruments of the Study

Document analysis is the main instrument. Thematic coding is used to analyze policy texts, treaties and secondary studies. These are compliance, enforcement, equity disputes and actor regulation. Comparative assessment across treaties strengthens the instrument by revealing patterns of continuity and change in governance approaches to climate challenges.

3.4.1 Validity of the Instrument

Triangulation ensures that good sources of data are used, including international agreements, policy reports, and peer-reviewed scholarship (McCharthy, 2015). This is a method that allows construct validity as it takes into consideration several perspectives, and external validity by placing global-level findings and regional vulnerabilities.

3.4.2 Reliability of the Instrument

The reliability will be ensured using a systematic coding procedure. The coding of all documents is done according to the same coding framework, and extensive documentation of coding options and interpretations is recorded. This is a procedure that offers transparency and allows the findings to be repeated by other scholars (Yona, 2015).

3.5 Data Collection

Data were collected from treaty repositories, UNFCCC databases, World Bank reports, and scholarly archives. To highlight the urgency of the data context, Figure 5 shows the projected rise in temperatures in the MENA region using the PRECIS climate model.




Figure 5: Summer and Winter temperature shift using the PRECIS model to collect data

Source: (Laura & Hayley, 2020)

Figure (5) a scientific projection illustrates why MENA is considered a climate change hotspot and underscores the importance of diplomatic and foreign policy interventions in the region.

3.6 Data Analysis

The analysis uses thematic analysis in three steps that include open coding, which focuses on identifying common ideas in treaty texts, axial coding, which relates the themes to the governance structures and selective coding, which integrates findings into plots that answer the research questions. The discussion highlights the role of foreign policy in influencing international relations and the role of governance systems in regulating various stakeholders. As an indication of the international consequences of policy decisions, Figure 6 shows the drastic decrease in CO₂ emissions in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic.




Figure 6: Annual Change in energy-related emissions, a total of 2.6 billion metric tons of CO₂ that will never be emitted due to COVID-19

Source: (Laura & Hayley, 2020)

Figure (6) above demonstrates that rapid collective action can achieve large amounts of reduction in emissions, which serves as a comparative basis on which international strategies of governance can be assessed.

4. Findings

4.1 Findings Related to the First Research Question: How does foreign policy shape and influence climate diplomacy in addressing global challenges such as transboundary emissions, equity disputes between developed and developing countries, and the enforcement of international climate agreements?

Foreign policy has become a critical lens through which Jordan interprets and addresses the challenges of climate diplomacy. Since the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1993, Jordan has been using diplomacy to not only show its dedication towards the world climate objectives, but also to emphasize its internal weaknesses. The climate diplomacy in this case can be seen as the manifestation of the Jordanian status as a water-poor and resource-starved state in a geopolitically vulnerable area, a region where climate change adds to the already tough problems of scarcity, population increase, and the influx of refugees.

Water scarcity is a national security and diplomatic issue that has featured in Jordanian foreign policy. The Kingdom is one of the four driest countries in the world, with an average annual precipitation of approximately 100–200 mm and a person-year water volume of under 100 cubic meters, which is significantly below the international water poverty threshold of 500 m³ (NAP,

2023). Furthermore, agriculture still consumes more than half of the Jordanian renewable water resources. This extreme disparity of supply and demand of water has been reiterated in Jordan's submissions to the UNFCCC as well as its Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2023).

To support this thesis, the water demand and deficit projections in the years 2013 and 2030 were assessed to show how climatic change is increasing the structural vulnerability of Jordan. According to Figure 7, the water demand in Jordan will be projected to surpass 1,600 million cubic meters (MCM) by 2030, whereas the water resources will be extremely insufficient, creating a shortage of more than 400 MCM (Jordan NAP, 2023). This growing difference justifies the foreign policy position of Jordan that efficient climate diplomacy should be followed by an effective equity framework to support countries that are unequally impacted by climate change.




Figure 7: Projected water demand and deficit, 2013-2030

Source: (Source: *Jordan National Adaptation Plan (2023)*, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Water and Irrigation.)

The foreign policy of Jordan is also exhibited in the way it addresses the regional water and environmental negotiations, such as the water dispute that involves the transboundary water resource, such as the Yarmouk River, which borders Jordan, Syria and Israel. These negotiations transcend environmental management and overlap with regional security processes, demonstrating that climate diplomacy cannot be separated from geopolitical factors.

At the international level, Jordan positions itself among developing countries in advocating for equity in burden-sharing. Its Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2023) increases the total emission reduction target to 31% by 2030 (including 5% unconditional and 26% conditional cuts, but only in the event of international help and funding). The approximated mitigation and adaptation cost has increased to USD 7.5 billion compared to USD 5.7 billion in the 2016 NDC due to both increased ambition and an increase in financial needs.

4.2 Findings Related to the Second Research Question: What mechanisms of regulation and governance can effectively manage the roles of key state and non-state actors in global climate diplomacy to enhance cooperation, accountability, and compliance with international environmental standards?

The governance aspect of climate diplomacy in Jordan indicates that the state has developed institutional processes to reconcile the domestic realities and international expectations. Institutional anchor, the creation of the National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC) based on Environmental Law No. 6 of 2017 and Climate Change Bylaw No. 79 of 2019 allows uniting the players of various ministries, civil society, the academic world, and the business community. The NCCC, which is chaired by the Ministry of Environment, is a body that makes climate diplomacy

not just a symbolic exercise, but also firmly entrenched in regulations that incorporate climate change in water, energy, agriculture and health policies. These structures are further guided by the National Climate Change Policy 2020–2050 and the National Adaptation Plan (2023), which outline Jordan’s long-term vision for integrated mitigation and adaptation governance.

In an attempt to increase accountability, Jordan has instituted a monitoring and reporting system that is institutionalized and in tandem with the international standards. One such figure is its greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory, which indicates the preeminence of the energy sector. According to Table 1, which is based on the Second Biennial Update Report of Jordan (2022) and Fourth National Communication (2023), the energy sector was the largest source of national emissions in 2016 (76.13), with waste in the second place (12.26), industrial processes (10.23) and agriculture, forestry and other land use placed third (1.38). These statistics indicate that the majority of mitigation measures and foreign-funding propositions remain energy-centred, which influences both the governance agenda and the foreign policy.

Category	Emissions (Gg CO ₂ Eq)	Percentage of Total
Energy	23,649.47	76.13 %
Industrial Processes and Product Use	3,177.42	10.23 %
Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use	428.71	1.38 %
Waste	3,807.73	12.26 %
Total National Emissions and Removals	31,063.32	100 %

Table 1: Jordan’s GHG Emissions by sector

Source: (Jordan’s Second Biennial Update Report (2022))

This regulation emphasis has also been enhanced by a matching of the climate action with the economic rationality. The National Green Growth Plan (NGGP) of Jordan was explicitly meant to show the economic paybacks of environmental sustainability in the long run. Figure (8) presents updated results from a cost-benefit analysis of eight major green growth interventions, showing that renewable energy desalination, public transport expansion, and freight rail projects yield the highest benefit-to-cost ratios. The results depict that climate investments do yield actual economic benefits, and this supports the idea that the climate policies are not economic liabilities but drivers of sustainable development.




Figure 8: Cost-Benefit Analysis for 8 green growth interventions

Source: (Green Growth Plan Update and Economic Modernization Vision (2022–2033))

Governance is also applied to regional cooperation. Jordan is another country participating in the MENA climate platform through which they exchange knowledge with other neighboring states to discuss the implementation of renewable energy. These regional arrangements not only strengthen the diplomatic position of Jordan, but also offer technical and financial access to cut off the dependence on hydrocarbons. On the international stage, Jordan's compliance with treaties—ranging from the 1995 Environmental Protection Law No. 12 to successive amendments—illustrates how domestic governance is aligned with international obligations, even though contradictions between environmental, agricultural, and public health laws reveal challenges in harmonization. Nevertheless, by embedding international standards into national legislation and creating institutions for enforcement, Jordan demonstrates how governance mechanisms can transform foreign policy commitments into practical climate action.

The findings in both research questions show that there is a mutual strengthening between foreign policy and governance. The foreign policy of Jordan transfers its internal weaknesses, particularly water scarcity and reliance on energy, to the global climate arena, requiring equality and fairness. At the same time, these commitments of the foreign policies are translated into domestic law and policy structures through governance mechanisms, where accountability and compliance would be ensured. Three insights stand out. To begin with, through foreign policy, Jordan can make climate change a question of justice and survival, and this will affect the way conflicts between developed and developing nations are negotiated. Second, international commitments are anchored through governance mechanisms that include the NCCC and national reporting systems in domestic institutions, and this increases the credibility of Jordan. Third, economic rationalization based on such instruments as cost-benefit analysis proves that climate action and growth can go hand in hand, thus drawing international backing and complying with it.

5. Discussion

5.1 Discussion Related to the First Research Question: How does foreign policy shape and influence climate diplomacy in addressing global challenges such as transboundary emissions, equity disputes between developed and developing countries, and the enforcement of international climate agreements?

The findings indicate that the foreign policy of Jordan presents climate change as a domestic survival concern and as a foreign policy tool to seek fair play on the international stage. This aligns with the body of the literature that insists on the fact that the issue of climate diplomacy cannot be discussed out of the context of the overarching foreign policy issues, as the national interests, security concerns, and geopolitical vulnerabilities determine the scope and the direction of the international cooperation (Harvey, 2019; Kuwonu, 2020). The continued presentation of water scarcity as a national security concern by Jordan shows how the vulnerability posed by resources can be strategically transposed into international diplomacy, which validates the realist views of environmental degradation as a threat multiplier that needs to be addressed with foreign policy (Westing, 2013; Werrell & Femia, 2019).

Jordan capitalizes on climate diplomacy to claim equity in the sharing of burdens by invoking the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities by associating itself with the developing nations and insisting on fairness. This is consistent with the results of the literature that the North-South divide is still the framework of negotiations, and developing nations emphasize historical injustices and insist on financial and technological transfers (Delgado, 2019; Sengupta & Friedman, 2019). According to the recent report on climate change provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2021-2023), to achieve global warming of less than 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level, the burning of greenhouse gases needs to be significantly reduced quickly and thoroughly by 2030 across all domains, which makes the urgency of collective action and the mechanisms of progress embedded in the Paris Agreement very topical. The Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2023) of Jordan increases the

target of the country to 31% of emissions by 2030, including 5% unconditional and 26% conditional reduction, indicating reduced compliance with the progression and transparency aspects of the Paris Agreement. The new cost of mitigation, USD 7.5 billion, is more aggressive and based on the dependence of the country on the international climate finance and technology transfer.

The findings also emphasize the fact that the conflicts over the transboundary resources like the Yarmouk River demonstrate the involvement of environmental and security problems in the regional diplomacy. This is aligned with the constructivist knowledge in the literature that stresses the fact that the meanings of resources and vulnerabilities are constructed socially as part of power relations and regional struggles (Zaree et al., 2016). By so doing, the climate diplomacy of Jordan can be seen as not only entailing emission cuts but also integrating the environmental issues in its overall foreign policy approach of regional stability and security.

Theoretically, the findings support the multidimensionality of the foreign policy towards climate diplomacy. The securitization of water scarcity by Jordan is explained through the realist lens, and its resort to multilateral frameworks like the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement as the means to increase its voice in the negotiation process is explained through the liberal-institutionalist views (Ghumman and Horney, 2016; Oberthür & Groen, 2017). Meanwhile, constructivist approaches describe how Jordan constructs vulnerability as a plea of justice, which transforms the sense of a domestic scarcity into a compelling story of diplomacy. Therefore, Jordan is a compelling example of the functioning of foreign policy at the crossroads of survival, equity, and global governance, which determines the results of climate diplomacy in a disintegrated world order.

5.2 Discussion Related to the Second Research Question: What mechanisms of regulation and governance can effectively manage the roles of key state and non-state actors in global climate diplomacy to enhance cooperation, accountability, and compliance with international environmental standards?

These findings indicate that Jordan has come up with institutional governance mechanisms that render foreign policy promises into home law and policy. The creation of the National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC) is an indication of the focus of the literature on the relevance of making the international obligations and the national implementation frameworks compatible (Pillay & Fitchett, 2019; Kamali & Jönsson, 2019). These institutional developments are continued in 2019 by the National Climate Change Policy 2020–2050 and the National Adaptation Plan (2023), offering strategic roadmaps on how mitigation and adaptation can be incorporated in national and sectoral plans. These tools provide consistency between the international engagements and the internal implementation in Jordan. It corresponds to institutionalist explanations of climate governance where monitoring, reporting, and compliance systems play a key role in reducing uncertainty and accountability (Bulkeley, 2015). The GHG emission inventory of Jordan, with its prevalence of the energy sector, demonstrates how the governance frameworks are evidence-based, contributing to the domestic planning process and diplomatic claims, interconnecting science and diplomacy by means of organized reporting (Detges, 2017).

This inclusion of climate action into the Jordanian National Green Growth Plan also supports the liberal-institutionalist perspective that climate policies have the potential to produce cascading benefits on top of emission cuts, such as economic prosperity and stability (Detges, 2017; Bloomberg, 2020). Transparency and accountability will improve the level of diplomatic credibility as Jordan becomes more transparent and accountable by quantifying the economic benefits of climate interventions to the international donors. This is evident in the First Transparency Report by Jordan (2024), which builds on top of the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) framework by putting climate data in ministries and reporting in a standard form as per the Enhanced Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement. The report highlights the continued efforts by Jordan to govern itself with evidence-based approaches and accessible

data to its national and international stakeholders. It falls in accordance with the literature on the value of the economic rationalization of the foreign policy to be able to receive international approval and be able to reconcile the environmental interests and the developmental ones (Council of the EU, 2020).

The findings also indicate that the mechanisms of governance in Jordan project towards regional and international cooperative forums. Participation in the MENA climate platform proves the point stated in the literature that climate diplomacy is becoming a more polycentric regulation, with subnational, regional, and transnational networks that do not necessarily involve state actors (Bulkeley, 2015; van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007). Nevertheless, conflicts among the environment, agricultural, and population health legislation signify the issues of harmonization, a larger body of literature on the fragmentation of governance and the overlaps of the institutions (Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

Another MENA state that has followed the path of institutional integration in seeking climate diplomacy can be used as a useful point of comparison with Egypt. Egypt National climate change strategy 2050 also works towards achieving coordination between ministries as well as integrating climatic governance within the development planning. Nevertheless, even though the Egyptian strategy has focused on the provision of large volumes of renewable energy and taking a lead as a mitigation actor, the Jordanian one sticks more with the concept of adaptation and resource sustainability, specifically in terms of water and energy. This comparison shows the varying ways in which national environments in MENA influence different ways of governance amidst the same overall weakness in the regions.

Theoretically, these findings highlight the role of governance as the working instrument of foreign policy in climate diplomacy. Institutionalist views clarify the importance of committees, inventories, and legal frameworks to guarantee the existence of compliance, whereas constructivist views emphasize that accountability mechanisms create a sense of trust and legitimacy in the international negotiation process (Zaree et al., 2016). Moreover, the need to have decentralized authority and multi-actor coordination that is implied in the polycentric regulation theories is echoed in Jordan in terms of its reliance on regional platforms and non-state involvement.

In addition to official state-based diplomacy and institutional governance practices, there are new bottom-up efforts in Jordan showing how societal actors can make commitments to climate at the community level. The Al-Munther Al-Monakhi Initiative is a voluntary project of the author initiated at COP29 that provides a realistic approach to climate diplomacy in society, bridging international climate systems and local action. By converting the tenets of the Paris Agreement and the Updated NDC of Jordan into culturally-driven community interventions, the project can enable youth, women, and media practitioners to deliver climate information to audiences in effective ways, enhance behavioral change, and amplify climate justice and inclusivity. It works under the framework of voluntarism, demonstrating the potential of community-based diplomacy as an addition to national plans, the involvement of the population, and the localization of global climate objectives. This process of bottom-up action illustrates that climate diplomacy does not cut off at the negotiations between states, but can be based on social mobilization and the climate literacy of the population, which contributes to the strengthening of the polycentric forms of governance addressed above.

Generally, the discussion reveals that the case of Jordan demonstrates the interconnection between foreign policy and governance in relation to climate diplomacy. Foreign policy allows Jordan to shift its weakness and equity demands to the international arena, and the governance systems document these demands in local practice and hold them accountable. These dynamics prove the theoretical framework on the plurality of approaches in governing global climate, namely realist, liberal, institutionalist, constructivist, which in a combination explain how such states as Jordan

cope with global climate governance (Hirst, 2015; Zaree et al., 2016). Jordan is showing how foreign policy and governance mutually support each other to address transboundary emissions, equity concerns, and enforcement issues in global climate negotiations by presenting climate change as a security concern and green growth as an opportunity.

6. Conclusion

This research has explored the interaction between foreign policy and climate diplomacy and how governmental weaknesses and strategic interests through Jordan inform its participation in global environmental activities. The results demonstrate how the foreign policy transfers the insecurities of the U.S. domestically, like the act of securitizing the water crisis, to international relations, following the realist perspective of environmental degradation as an amplifier of threats (Westing, 2013; Werrell and Femia, 2019). At the same time, when he appeals to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, Jordan allies with developing countries to promote climate justice, which is expressed in liberal-institutionalist and constructivist visions of existing unequal relations between the North and South (Delgado, 2019; Sengupta & Friedman, 2019; Zaree et al., 2016).

Institutional anchors of responsibility and credibility are represented by the mechanisms of governance, like the National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC), national GHG inventories, and the National Green Growth Plan (Bulkeley, 2015; Detges, 2017). With the recent incorporation of the Fourth National Communication (2023), Second Biennial Update Report (2022), and Updated NDC (2023), the restoration of the measure of progress in the combination of mitigation and adaptation actions became apparent and was now adjusted to the National Adaptation Plan of Jordan (2023) and Economic Modernization Vision (2022-2033). These results support the idea that foreign policy and climate governance do reinforce each other and institutionalize the diplomatic commitment to domestic policy arrangements and provide insights into how middle-income state can improve their climate credibility and sustainability in global governance.

The Al-Munther Al-Monakhi Initiative is another important example of how volunteering, community-based action can strengthen national pledges and broaden the boundaries of climate diplomacy beyond formal negotiations and incorporate climate governance into society.

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