Publication Details
Abstract
This article provides an in-depth analysis of the application challenges of patent theories in biotechnology. The primary objective is to identify adaptation problems of classical patent theories (incentive, natural rights, social contract, and economic efficiency theories) to the specific characteristics of biotechnology and propose solutions. The research employs comparative legal, analytical, and systematic approaches. The application of Kenneth Arrow's incentive theory, John Locke's natural rights theory, social contract theory, and economic efficiency theory in the biotechnology context is examined. The main finding demonstrates that classical patent theories do not fully function in biotechnology due to specific characteristics such as self-replication capabilities of living organisms, genetic variability, and anticommons problems. Additionally, the length of innovation cycles for biotechnological inventions, high costs and risks significantly affect patent investments, patent cliff phenomena, and Eroom's law impact are demonstrated. Research findings can be applied in patent law reform, creating special legal regimes for biotechnology, and developing balanced patent policy for developing countries like Uzbekistan. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of reconsidering traditional patent paradigms for biotechnology and developing specialized legal instruments.