FORMATION OF THE STATE BANK OF THE BUKHARA PEOPLE’S SOVIET REPUBLIC (BPSR) AND THE NATIONAL CURRENCY CRISIS IN 1922–1924: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Objective: This article analyzes the creation, operation, and national currency crisis of the State Bank of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR) between 1922 and 1924 from an economic-institutional perspective. Method: The study is based on primary archival sources from the National Archives of Uzbekistan (NAU), detailing the emission volumes of the "Bukhara bon" and reports on the transfer of gold reserves. Results: The author challenges the Soviet historiographical thesis that "the devaluation of Bukhara currency was solely caused by internal economic sabotage," proving instead that the core reason for the crisis was artificial institutional and political pressure exerted by the RSFSR. Novelty: The study provides an economic-institutional reinterpretation of the national currency crisis of the State Bank of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR) by using primary archival sources from the National Archives of Uzbekistan (NAU).